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Abstract  
This paper investigates the bank-level and country-level factors determining 
nonperforming loans (NPL) in the commercial banking industry of Gulf Cooperation 
Council (GCC) countries. Specifically; it examines the impact of the sectoral 
distribution financing growth and Islamic finance methods growth on NPL. To do so, 
we apply generalized method of moments (GMM) techniques, over the 2005-2011 
period. Our findings indicate that the sectoral distribution of Islamic financing has an 
adverse impact on NPL, which suggest that the sectoral financing growth of Islamic 
banks increases the credit risk exposure more than conventional banks. The findings 
of the Islamic finance methods growth show that the impact of fixed-income debt 
contracts could increase NPL more than profit-and-loss-sharing contracts. 
 
Keywords: Nonperforming loans; commercial banks, Islamic finance, generalized 
method of moments; GCC countries. 
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1. Introduction 
The determinants of financial stability are important and controversial at the same 
time. Problem loans can be considered as an important factor for financial stability 
and source of worry in the banking system in developed as well as in developing 
countries. One of such sources is the magnitude and the nature of non-performing 
loans (henceforth NPL) as part of credit risk and its management process (see, 
Demirguc-Kunt, 1989; Whalen, 19991; Farooq and Zaheer, 2015). While NPL remain 
an important source of risk to be tackled in the conventional banks (CB) (Barr and 
Siems, 1994; Wheelock and Wilson, 1995), Islamic banks (IB) are also subject to 
NPL (Baele et al., 2014).  
The literature on the determinants of NPL within banking sector is voluminous.  
There is, however, no research so far (to our best of knowledge) has examined the 
impact of sectoral financing growth and Islamic financing methods on NPL. 
Commercial and Islamic banking are influenced by both the microeconomic dynamics 
and macroeconomic environments, such as the impact of the business cycles (see: 
Beck et al., 2013), and financial surroundings (Baele et al., 2014; Farooq and Zaheer, 
2015). This consequently implies that the financial market downturn in 2006 and the 
financial crisis in 2008-2009 had an effect on the performance of conventional and 
Islamic financial system of the GCC countries (Khamis et al., 2010).   
With this backdrop, we attempt in this paper to contribute to the determinants of NPL 
banking literature, in general, and IB in particular, through studying the relationship 
between bank-level, country-level factors and NPL in the GCC countries. In addition, 
we examine the impact of the sectoral distribution financing and the distribution of 
Islamic financial methods on the observed trends of NPL. In doing so, we apply a 
panel of five GCC countries using GMM, over the period 2005 to 2011. The reason 
for using the GMM approach is because it allows capturing the accurate dynamic 
effect that could take place via variables influence NPL (Fiordelisi et al., 2011; Louzis 
et al., 2012).     
This study extends the literature of NPL in four aspects. First, we investigate the 
relationship between sectoral financing growth and NPL, by using three variables, 
which are real-estate construction financing, manufacturing-industry of all 
commercial banks, and real-estate construction financing of IB. Given that the 
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influence of business cycle that can be captured through several possible indicators, 
such as credit to the privet sector, house price and equity price (Nkusu, 2011), we 
believe that our selected determinants do represent the most appropriate indicators to 
measure the influence of business cycle on NPL of the GCC banking sector. To the 
best of our knowledge, our paper is one of the first studies to specifically consider the 
impact of sectoral financing on NPL, using the three above mentioned variables. 
Second, we measure the linkage between Islamic financing instruments and NPL, by 
utilising the growth rate of profit-loss-sharing (PLS) contracts variable and fixed-
income creating debt (FID) contracts variable. In fact, the nature of financing 
instruments or contracts in CB differ than IB. Abedifar et al. (2013) and Daher et al. 
(2015) point out that IB mostly apply non-PLS contracts, because they are not risky as 
PLS contracts and technically they are similar to CB practices. These variables have 
not been used before in investigating the determinants of NPL. Third, we test the 
robustness of our results by using two different approaches; we start with panel data 
models to check the validity of the country-level and bank-level factors, that 
contributing to NPL in the IB. Then, we study the link between efficiency and NPL 
that is introduced by Berger and DeYoung (1997). In the latter fitted approach, we 
apply data envelopment analysis (DEA) method to obtain more precise efficiency 
scores. In addition, we check the validity of the obtained efficiency scores through 
applying stochastic frontier method (SFA) (Berger and Humphrey, 1997). Finally, we 
consider the GCC region, of 51 banks, including IB and CB. The focus on the GCC 
countries is particularly due to the expansion of the economies of those countries has 
resulted in the rapid development of the financial sector elements, including IB. For 
example, in 2013 the percentage of the global total assets of IB accounted for by the 
GCC region was 39.2%, compared to 38.6% in non-GCC Middle East countries, 
19.6% in Asia, 1.7% in Australia, Europe, and America (The Banker, 2013, 
November). This development and expansion of IB in the region has contributed to 
further growth of the bank credit system. Therefore, we believe that it is vital to 
investigate the impact of such banks on NPL in the GCC region.    
Our findings indicate that the growth rates of sectoral financing variables present a 
relatively similar adverse impact on NPL. Furthermore, the real-estate-construction 
financing of IB with one-year lag variable suggest that the financing of IB increases 
the risk exposure. Regarding to our results on the PLS growth, we suggest that despite 
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the high risk-level in PLS instruments, increasing the PLS financing could lead to a 
decrease in NPL. However, the financing growth path of FID variable could harm the 
loan quality more than PLS instruments.  
The remainder of the paper is organised as follows. Section 2 provides an extensive 
survey of NPL literature to put our study in context. Section 3 discusses brief 
information on banking sector in the GCC. Section 4 presents the data and describes 
the determining factors of NPL. Section 5 explains the details of econometric 
methodology used to analyse the determents factors of NPL. The empirical results of 
the paper are discussed in Section 6. Finally, the conclusion is presented in Section 7.  		
2. Literature Review  
The available body of knowledge on banking indicates that NPL or issues regarding 
problem loans have been examined from several perspectives. Initially, NPL were 
utilised as an indicator to reflect asset quality within the relevant literature (see: 
Meeker and Gray, 1987). Some studies focused on investigating the causes that 
precipitate a bank’s failure, including NPL and efficiency levels, where NPL are 
considered to be one of the key factors (for example, Demirgüç-Kunt, 1989; Whalen, 
1991; Barr and Siems, 1994; Wheelock and Wilson, 1995). The second trend in the 
literature focused on examining the link between bank performance and efficiency, 
such as productive and cost efficiency and NPL, by using strategies that included the 
Granger-causality method to explore the directions of the intertemporal relationship 
between these elements (Berger and DeYoung, 1997; Podpiera and Weill, 2008; 
Fiordelisi et al., 2011). The final and recent trends in the literature that are related to 
NPL seem to concentre on investigating the determinants of NPL within banking 
sector in the form of macroeconomic and microeconomic factors (Salas and Saurina, 
2002; Lu et al., 2005; Espinoza and Prasad, 2010; Louzis et al., 2012). Furthermore, 
some recent studies have investigated the relationship between NPL or loan loss 
provisioning, macroeconomic factors, and business cycle (Nkusu, 2011; Beck et al., 
2013; Soedarmono et al., 2016).  
Among the literature relating to banking studies and on the subject of NPL, Berger 
and DeYoung (1997) report four significant hypotheses when examining the 
relationship between NPL, cost efficiency, and equity capital in the US commercial 
banks, from 1985 to 1994, which are ‘bad management’, ‘bad luck’, ‘skimping’ and 
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‘moral hazard’. It was found that increasing NPL can decrease the measured cost 
efficiency, which implies that diminishing the reduction in NPL by increasing 
administration expenses can lead to a decrease in the cost efficiency. On the contrary, 
NPL are considered to be increasing due to the lower cost effacing, indicating a low 
level of management. However, Podpiera and Weill (2008) attribute the probability of 
bank failure and increasing NPL with low level of cost efficiency on management 
quality only (‘bad management’ hypothesis) and they, consequently, rejected ‘bad 
luck’ hypothesis. 
Empirically, a number of papers have investigated the determinants of NPL by 
utilising dynamic panel GMM methods, for the reason that such methods help to 
capture the accurate dynamic effect of NPL. For instance, Salas and Saurina (2002) 
examine the determinants of credit risk within commercial and savings banks in 
Spain, from 1985 to 1997, including factors related to both macro-level and bank-
level variables by using GMM-difference. They concluded that there was a significant 
variance between commercial and savings banks in terms of financial risk 
management. For both bank types, they stated that bank-specific variables are, 
however, useful when utilised as timely warning pointers, such as when approaching 
net interest margin (NIM) and bank size portfolio diversifications. Another empirical 
study, which employed GMM method, is by Espinoza and Prasad (2010), who 
investigate the relationship between NPLs, macroeconomic factors, and some selected 
bank-level factors of the GCC’s banking sector by focusing on non-oil GDP, for the 
period of 1995 to 2008. Their findings also indicated that bank-level variables can be 
used as early warning indicators for future problem loans, and they found that non-oil 
GDP is adversely related to NPL. Another of their findings suggested that the global 
financial surroundings have an impact on NPL. 
By using Granger-causality and GMM methods, Fiordelisi et al. (2011) examine the 
inter-temporal relationship between NPL and bank efficiency of the European 
banking sector, which support ‘bad management’ hypothesis by generating evidence 
that banks with lower level of efficiency tend to have higher bank risk. However, they 
find that bi- directional causal relationship between capital and NPL, could be used as 
an indicator for bank risk. A more recent empirical study is that by Louzis et al. 
(2012) in the case of Greek banks over the period of 2003 to 2009, which conclude 
that the problem loans in the banking sector are related to macro-level factors, 
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including interest rate and unemployment, and subsequently by micro-level factors, 
especially those that reflect the quality of management, such as the ratio for the return 
on equity. Djalilov and Piesse (2016) examine the determinants of bank profitability 
in the early transition countries of Central and Eastern Europe and the late transition 
countries of the former Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR), through 
employing GMM model, from 2000 to 2013. It is found that, credit risk increases 
bank profitability in the early transition countries, while credit risk decreases bank 
profitability in the late transition countries. Overall, banks in early transition countries 
are more robust than late transition counties of USSR.   
Some studies have focused on examining the impact of macroeconomic and business 
cycles on NPL. For instance, Nkusu (2011) investigate the relationship between NPL 
and macroeconomic factors by using two approaches. The first approach is based on 
single-equation panel regressions, which is utilised to prove that a decrease in the 
development of macroeconomic factors are linked to increasing NPL. The second 
approach is that of a panel vector autoregressive, which is used to investigate the 
dynamic interaction of variables determining NPL towards a shock in the system, with 
particular focus on the global financial crisis, in 2008 through sample consisting of 26 
advanced countries, for the period of 1998 to 2009. It is found that regardless of the 
causes of problem loans, a significant increase in NPL leads to a rise in the NPL 
themselves through a linear response that may continue from the first shock up until 
the fourth year.  
In expanding the research on the subject matter, a recent study by Beck et al. (2013) 
investigate the link between macroeconomic factors and NPL, in 75 countries, from 
2002 to 2010, by utilising dynamic panel data model. They conclude that the key 
factor affecting NPL is GDP growth, meaning that the impact of the global financial 
crisis, which affects the economic activity of each country, was the most risky factor 
for bank asset quality. Meanwhile, the concept of NPL or asset quality in those 
countries is found to be influenced by additional factors, such as exchange rate, share 
prices, and the lending interest rate.                       
Among the available studies focusing on examining the determinants of NPL in IB 
sector, some investigations have explored the efficacy and financial stability of IBs 
and the CB sectors. For instance, Cihak and Hesse (2010) examine the financial 
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stability of 77 IB, and 397 CB, via applying z-score as an independent variable that is 
mainly measured through equity capital, reserves, average return and assets of each 
bank, by differentiating between banks size. They conclud that small IB appear to be 
more stable than large IB, as large CB seem to be more stable than large IB. Such 
study relatively covered a large sample from different 19 banking system; indeed, it 
did focuses on financial stability and financial risk without taking into account the 
impact of NPL. However, another example, Rahim et al. (2012) compare the CB and 
IB in relation to financial stability by employing z-score and NPL as indicators 
reflecting the financial stability in Malaysia, from 2005 to 2010, through the use of 
the panel data FE model. Their analysis included some independent variables that 
related to bank-level, such as asset quality and cost-income ratio, which indicates to 
efficiency, and macro-level variables, including market share, Herfindahl Index, 
inflation, and real GDP. Rahim et al. find that the financial stability in IB are 
somehow more constant than in the case of CB, which were affected significantly by 
efficiency, the Herfindahl Index, inflation, and real GDP. Nevertheless, they noted 
that those variables were not particularly significant with financial stability indicators 
in CB. 
Furthermore, Abedifar et al. (2013) investigate bank risk and stability of 118 IB, 81 
IW and 354 CB, over the period 1999-2009, through three dependent variables, 
namely, credit risk, which is measured by loan loss reserve, to pinpoint management 
quality of loan portfolio. In addition, bank insolvency is used to represent banks’ 
stability, which is measured by z-score. The study also included interest rate, which is 
proxied by net interest margin, to capture as to whether IB charge a higher rate or 
lower rate to depositors. It is found that, IB mostly apply non-PLS contracts, which 
are technically similar to CB practices. In addition, small IB seem to be at lower credit 
risk and more stable than CB, and IB appear to charge their clients for providing 
Islamic finance products. Louhichi and Boujelbene (2016) investigate the 
determinants of NPL in Islamic and conventional banks, from 10 Organization of 
Islamic Cooperation countries, over the period 2005-2012, through applying GMM 
system technique and panel vector autoregressive framework. Louhichi and 
Boujelbene conclude that macro-level and institutional factors have effects in 
determining NPL, IB differ from CB towards NPL because IB are interest-free banks 
and they share profit with the investment account holders. However, it is necessary to 
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investigate credit risk that involves with Islamic finance contracts, in order to improve 
and innovative risk management in IB.  
In terms of the GCC countries, Al-Wesabi and Ahmad (2013) investigate the credit 
risk of IB, through employing NPL as a proxy for credit risk, for the period 2006-
2010. It is found that credit risk is significantly affected by management quality, 
liquidity, risky assets and GDP, where inflation and interest rate is not found to play 
an important role in explaining the credit risk of IB. Ashraf et al. (2016) examine the 
impact of ownership structure and income diversification on financial stability of 
GCC banks, over the period 2000-2011, through utilising Z-score technique. It is 
concluded that regardless the type of shareholders’ concentration, the relationship 
between the concentration of ownership and insolvency risk is positive. In addition to 
that, the income diversification increases the financial stability of banks. However, 
regulatory system needs to be improved in the region. It should be noted that it is 
understandable that z-score and related empirical models are used to explore credit 
risk and financial stability; however, such models do not take into consideration the 
dynamic impacts on financial stability of the GCC banking sector in general and IB 
sector in particular. Al-Gasaymeh (2016) examines the determinants of bank 
efficiency in the GCC region, covering the period 2007-2014, by applying SFA to 
construct cost efficiency scores and GMM system model to investigate the impact of 
loan concentration ratio, debt in default, credit risk rating and political risk variables. 
It is concluded that increasing loan concentration leads to decrease efficiency, besides 
that political stability plays a vital role to enhance banks’ efficiency. However, Al-
Gasaymeh has not taken in account the impact of bank type, Islamic or conventional, 
on banks’ efficiency, since banks system in the GCC countries is dual, such matter is 
vital to be considered in exploring banks’ efficiency in this region.    
In a recent comprehensive and comparative study, Beck et al. (2013) examine the 
business orientation, bank efficiency, and stability of IB and CB from 22 countries 
over the period of 1995 to 2009, utilising NPL as a proxy for asset quality. It is 
concluded that in general NPL are affected adversely by IB. Beck et al. noted, 
however, that during the global financial crisis the performance of IB was higher than 
that of CB in terms of asset quality and capitalisation.  
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Our study is distinct from other empirical studies, in exploring the NPL of the GCC’s 
commercial banking sector, by examining the link between the growth of sectoral 
financing, Islamic financing methods or instruments, and NPL or loan quality1.  
3. Overview of Islamic Finance Development  
Islamic banking and finance differ from its conventional counterparts in terms of 
practice of the financial transactions as they avoid several prohibited aspects 
particularly in interest and uncertainty, which are based on Islamic law principles (El-
Gamal, 2006). Therefore, there is a significant difference in applications of lending 
and investment to acquire the specified level of profit between conventional and 
Islamic financial institutions. Indeed, Islamic banks offer a range of financial services 
and products, and most of them are categorized into trade and investment that is based 
on equity participation, profit, loss and risk sharing between banks and investors 
(Ayub, 2007; Iqbal and Mirakhor, 2011).  
The development of Islamic banking and finance has taken place over the last four 
decades; the initial experience of Islamic banking began in Egypt in 1963 with the 
establishment of the Mith Gharm bank. After its closure due to the political reasons, 
the Nasser Social Bank was established in 1971 as another/the Islamic Bank in Egypt. 
The aim of this bank was predominantly to finance poor people and small projects. 
However, these initial experiences drew the attention of policy makers, thus, this 
culminated in the launch of the Islamic Development Banks (IDB) by the 
Organization of Islamic Conference (OIC) in 1975, which remains the most 
significant event in the development of Islamic banking. More importantly, in 1975 
the first commercial Islamic bank was initiated in Dubai, namely the Dubai Islamic 
Bank, with the involvement of businessmen and UAE and Kuwait governments (Iqbal 
and Molyneux, 2016).  
The most vital period in the history of growth of Islamic banking and finance 
occurred between the mid-1970s and 1990s. These may be due to the following: first, 
several Islamic financial institutions were established in many Muslim countries all 
over the world. In addition to this, Islamic finance products were adopted to be 
offered by a number of multinational conventional banks to consumers. Secondly, the 
																																								 																					
1 Some studies utilised NPL as an indicator for loan quality, such as those by Hughes and Mester 
(1993); see Berger and DeYoung (1997: 853).    
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development of Islamic finance underwent advancement in aspects regarding its 
financial modes, transactions and products. More importantly, in the third stage of 
development, the application of a number of Islamic finance functions and modes 
were acknowledged from two different international institutions (i.e. International 
Monetary Fund (IMF) and the World Bank). Also, these institutions published 
working papers describing the impact of the Islamic banking system in the 1990s. 
Finally, three countries in the Muslim world, namely, Iran, Pakistan and Sudan, 
replaced interest from their entire banking system with Islamic finance models (Iqbal 
and Molyneux, 2016) in steady steps At present the number of commercial and 
investment Islamic banks around the world has increased to reach more than 75 
countries (Ayub, 2007). For instance, according to The Banker in 2016 the total sharia 
compliant assets of financial institutions in the Middle East and North African 
(MENA) countries has increased from $250 billion, in 2006, to more than $1100 
billion, in 2016. Moreover, in the GCC countries the total sharia compliant assets has 
risen from more than $120 billion to about $720 billion, between the period of 2006 
and 2016 (The Banker, 2016, November). 
Several institutions are established to provide strength to the development and growth 
of Islamic banking and finance, based on the perspectives of regulation, liquidity and 
accounting. Those institutions include Accounting and Auditing Organization for 
Islamic Financial Institutions (AAOIFI) started 1991, International Islamic Financial 
Market (IIFM) established 2002, Liquidity Management Centre (LMC) launched 
2002, and finally Islamic Financial Services Board (IFSB), which was also sat up in 
2002. In addition, in 1999 Dow Jones Islamic Market World Index was initiated to 
produce standards and tools for investors and decrease sharia compliant research 
expenses. Dow Jones Islamic indexes as well as Financial Times Stock Exchange 
(FTSE), which have launched a number of Islamic indicators by tracking 
approximately 2000 international companies which meet the Islamic law principles 
for investors (Iqbal and Molyneux, 2016; Ayub, 2007). 
Islamic finance products are not just used by Islamic banks but these are also used by 
conventional banks. Many of these conventional banks have offered Islamic financial 
services particularly in the Middle East region. Conventional banks in non-Muslim 
countries and communities also have offered Islamic finance products for its 
consumers. In the European region, Britain is considered as a centre and main leader 
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in fostering Islamic finance, several Islamic financial institutions, including five 
Islamic investment banks, are permitted by Financial Service Authority (FSA), such 
as Islamic Bank of Britain, European Islamic Investment Bank and Gatehouse Bank. 
Despite such developments, there are some challenges. For instance, Islamic finance 
institutions suffer inappropriate regulatory regime, and the shortage in innovation and 
developing their products remains an important area of development but also a 
challenge.	
4. The Banking Sector and Trends of NPL in the GCC Countries  
The oil boom in the GCC countries has had a significant impact on the development 
of the banking sector, although development trajectories have taken several stages, 
this section only intends to highlight the role of the banking sector in the GCC region. 
For instance in 2010, the total assets ratio of the banking sector to GDP in Bahrain, 
where accounted for 224% of the GDP, which has taken first place among the other 
countries, and the statistics emphasise Bahrain’s heavy dependency on its financial 
sector. For Kuwait, its banking assets represented 131% of the GDP; the UAE, Qatar 
and Saudi Arabia exhibited commercial banking assets of approximately 122%, 94% 
and 80% of the GDP, respectively (Alandejani and Asutay, 2015).  
In terms of bank type, the region’s financial system is dominated by three type of 
banking, namely IB, hybrid banks in the form of providing Islamic banking through 
IW and acting as CB, and CB. Alandejani and Asutay (2015) indicate that assets share 
to total assets of IB account for 19%, with sixteen IB; the assets of IW represent the 
largest portion of assets at around 56% with eighteen banks; and the assets for CB 
represent 25% of the total banking activity in twenty banks within the GCC region. 
It should be noted that the estimates is based on the GCC countries including Bahrain, 
Kuwait, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, and the UAE but excludes Oman, as Oman’s Islamic 
banking and finance sector can only traced back to three years. 
 
Insert Figure 1 
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As for the developments and trends in the NPL in the region, Figure 1 depicts the 
trends in NPL as a ratio of GDP in each country. As can be seen, NPL ratio increased 
sharply with the exception of Qatar, and it reached its peak in 2009. In particular, in 
the case of the UAE, it reached its peak in 2009, which can be explained by the 
impact of the global financial crises as the UAE is considered as the most 
financialised country in the region. As indicated in the figures, NPL rose significantly 
in Kuwait during 2009 because of real estate financing and equities. In addition, from 
the perspective of an individual bank, the Gulf Bank in 2008 had higher losses due to 
derivatives transactions linked to clients. In the UAE, during 2009, NPL has 
increased, one of the main reason of this increase is that the Central Bank authorised 
instructions to classify loans to the Saudi Arabian conglomerates, namely Algosaibi 
and Al-Saad groups, as bad-loans (Khamis et al., 2010: 5). However, the impact of 
global financial crisis should also be considered in the increase of the NPL, as Dubai, 
one of the Emirates of the UAE, went through financial difficulties and was bailed out 
by Abu Dhabi.  
With regards to the GDP trends, as can be seen in Figure 1, the real GDP growth 
declined dramatically in 2009 without exception, especially in Kuwait and the UAE. 
The initial observations from the panel of figures in Figure 1 indicate that GDP 
growth comparatively diminishes NPL.    
When reflecting on the economic realities of the region, it should be noted that the 
non-oil GDP growth could have a significant impact on NPL in the GCC banks, for 
oil prices in the Gulf countries have remained constantly high over the period from 
2005 to 2010 and have steadily increased the revenues (Khamis et al., 2010: 6). In 
support of the previous statement, Espinoza and Prasad (2010) argue that non-oil GDP 
would be a better selection criterion for NPL, given that the oil companies are owned 
by the state and loans are therefore not defaulted by them. In addition, the oil revenues 
spread to the non-oil channels in the economy, such as through public spending and 
household expenditures; they thus claimed that it would be better to investigate this 
impact through the real non-oil GDP growth. Consequently, the increase in non-oil 
real GDP is expected to result in a decline in NPL, meaning that the relationship 
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between these two variables is expected to be negative 2 . In general, NPL are 
systematically affected by macroeconomic performance and business cycles (Nkusu, 
2011).  
As regards to the breakdown of Islamic financing modes, It should be noted that the 
aggregate PLS contracts which are operated by IB in the GCC is relatively small 
when compared with FID instruments, as there is a strong preference for FID due to 
their less risky nature. For instance, in 2011 the PLS contracts in total Islamic 
financing contracts accounted for 0.6%, 9.9%, 6.2%, and 2.3%, respectively, in Saudi 
Arabia, the UAE, Bahrain, and Qatar. Thus, IB prefer to operate through cost-plus 
sale or FID instruments as a substitute to credit and loans in CB (Hassan and Lewis, 
2007; Ayub, 2007; Ahmed, 2011).  
Insert Figure 2 
 
As displayed in Figure 2, the PLS financing to total financing for IB has not even 
reached 18% in the UAE; the lowest percentage appears in Saudi Arabia IB with 
about 1%. In comparison, Figure 3 depicts the share of FID transactions in the total 
financing for each country.  
 
Insert Figure 3 
 
As can be seen in Figure 3, the share of FID generally fluctuated between 85% and 
above, which implies that IB in the GCC countries have heavily relied on FID type 
financing instruments, particularly murabahah financing. From the financing 
portfolios in IB, it can be noted that the managers in IB do avoid higher levels of risk. 
Even in the presence of well-monitored credit policy, these IB may control the default 
loans by increasing the admission fees in such transactions. This action ultimately 
could have a negative impact on businesses cycle and real GDP growth, which may 
then increase the NPL. Although FID contracts are more favourable in the operations 																																								 																					2	The non-oil real GDP growth variable is taken from The Economist Intelligence Unit reports, through 
the real change in origin of GDP (%) in all sectors with the exception of industry, because this sector is 
heavily dependent on oil and petrochemical companies.      
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of IB than PLS modes due to the less risky nature of these instruments, the impact of 
the former group could be positive with NPL, whereas the directional nature of PLS 
contracts on NPL cannot be predicted.  
5. Describing the Determinants of NPL  
After an extensive review of the available literature, the variables used in this study 
are defined when forming the empirical models to be tested. Based on the available 
literature, the variables used in empirical models in this study are classified as 
macroeconomic variables, organisational - and structure - oriented variables, product-
development-related variables, and bank-level variables. 
The relationship between the macroeconomic environment and NPLs is investigated 
by a number of studies in banking literature (see: Salas and Saurina, 2002; Louzis et 
al., 2012), which include variables such as the real GDP growth, non-oil GDP growth, 
sectoral financing, organisational structure, and product-development factors. By 
reflecting on these factors, this study considers the following variables: 
Growth of financing for the real estate and construction sectors by at CB;  
Growth of financing for the manufacturing and industry sectors by CB; 
Asset growth of CB; 
Fully-fledged IB financing growth for the real estate and construction sectors;  
Growth in the assets size of fully-fledged IB and IW; 
The growth of Shari’ah-compliant assets in IB and IW;  
The growth of profit-loss-sharing (PLS) financing; 
The growth of fixed-income creating debt (FID) financing.  
The next factor, which is considered to have a determining impact on NPL, is that of 
bank structure and organisational development, which is in turn related to the bank 
type. Table 1 presents the definition of the variables used, which include the growth 
rate of assets size of fully-fledged IB, IW, and CB, as well as hypotheses suggested to 
be tested. The link between the ratio of NPL and each of these variables is unclear in 
terms of its direction. Salas and Saurina (2002) and Louzis et al. (2012) stated that 
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bank size itself, without the growth rate, indicates a risk of diversification, implying 
that bigger banks have significant potential for additional opportunities in 
diversification, which is associated negatively with NPL. Such variables can therefore 
be utilised as a proxy to assess the link between the growth rates for each bank type. 
This notion is particularly true if they differ in risk-taking behaviour to diversify their 
portfolios between high-risk projects and low-risk projects with more conditions and 
restrictions, where a negative link with NPL signifies a lower risk of diversification in 
contrast to a positive relationship with NPL, which indicates a higher risk of 
diversification. 
The last factor is product development, which is associated with the allocation of type 
of Islamic financing (IF) contracts according to their categories, which are PLS and 
FID types of financings. As is recognised in Islamic finance literature, PLS modes of 
financing include mudarabah and musharakah, while FID contracts are comprised of 
murabahah (mark-up pricing), and deferred sales, such as ijarah or leasing and hire 
purchase, salam and istisna 3. It is essential for this study to investigate the influence 
of the financing of IB through both PLS and FID instruments on NPL. The growth 
rate of each category in each country is calculated in order to examine the effect of 
these variables.  
After discussing the potential macro-level, organisational, structural, and product-
development-related determining factors of NPL as envisaged by the theoretical 
framework, this section focuses on micro-level or bank-specific factors, which include 
RWA, two selected financial ratios (ROE and NIM) to reflect upon the indicators of a 
bank’s profitability, and efficiency scores. 
  
																																								 																					
3  In the current study sample, Kuwait’s IBs, including the Kuwait Finance House, the Kuwait 
International Bank and the Boubyan Bank KSC, have not provided any PLS contracts. Again, in this 
study sample and over the observed period, it is located that none of the IBs have utilised a salam 
contract except Dubai Islamic Bank, which used this instrument for the period of 2010 to 2011 with 
2.45% and 6.15% of total Islamic financing modes.     
16 
Table 1: Definition of Variables and Hypotheses  
Variable   Definition  Hypothesis Tested !"# NPL to gross loans (dependent variable NPL)  The prior NPL put more load on the current NPL 
(+)  $%& Risk-weighted assets to total assets Credit risk capture (+) $'( Return on equity =  )*+,-./012+.34	678-.9	01	 Bad management (-) !:; Net interest margin = )*+,-.	<3*=->	(3,.6*	6@A48B->=	->.6*6/.	6@C6>/6/)01	EF6*3=6	+,	63*>->=	3//6./01	  Risky loan portfolio (-)  (GGHIJ Efficiency scores obtained from DEA    Bad management, bad luck (-) and skimping (+)   (GGKLJ Efficiency scores obtained from SFA Bad management, bad luck (-) and skimping (+) ∆NO" Real growth of Gross Domestic Product  Prosperity (-) ∆	PQP − QST	NO" Non-oil GDP growth   Prosperity (-) ∆:; Manufacturing and industry financing growth    Interaction with business cycle and real GDP (-) ∆$(U Real estate and construction of GCC banks financing growth  Interaction with business cycle and real GDP (-) ∆$(U:V real estate, and construction financing growth of IB Interaction with business cycle and real GDP (-) ∆:V& Fully-fledged assets of IB to total assets growth  Less risk in diversification (-), high risk in diversification (+)  ∆:%& Islamic window assets to total assets growth Less risk in diversification (-), high 
risk in diversification (+) ∆:V:%& IB and Islamic window assets to total assets growth Less risk in diversification (-), high risk in diversification (+) ∆UV& CB assets to total assets growth    Less risk in diversification (-), high 
risk in diversification (+) ∆"#W PLS contracts financing to total Islamic financing growth  Less concentrated in transactions of IB (Unknown) ∆G:O FID contracts financing to total Islamic financing growth More concentrated in transactions of IB (+) 
 
With regard to RWA to gross total assets ratio, the RWA captures the credit risk of 
bank portfolios when considering some aspects such as the sort of debtor and the 
actual collateral and guarantees. It is measured according to the Basel II Accord, 
which provides definite requirements, including lending policies from bank 
regulators. Repullo and Suarez (2013) suggest, however, that the capital buffers under 
Basel II are not sufficient to counteract any recession on the supply of credit to bank 
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debtors. In addition, De Lis et al. (2001) highlight that credit is likely to rise faster 
during expansion and slower during recession than GDP. Such arguments demonstrate 
key evidence as to the effects of financial crises and downturn on the business cycle, 
wherein RWA increases because it utilises the capital buffers as one of the 
requirements in Basel II; a rise in this ratio leads to an increase in the present or future 
value of NPLs. The link between RWA ratio and NPL is shown by Berger and 
DeYoung (1997) to be positive, given that increasing the credit risk in bank portfolios 
leads to an increase in NPL. Therefore, the relationship between RWA and NPL is 
predicted to be positive.      
Turning to performance and profitability ratios (including ROE and NIM), the ROE 
reflects the management quality, which is found to be negatively related to NPLs in 
the study by Louzis et al. (2012), which pointed out that due to the previous 
performance of bank management a negative link between ROE and NPL could be 
seen, which is indicative of ‘bad management’ hypothesis. In the short term, the ROE 
ratio may, however, have a positive relationship with NPL; for example, the bank may 
elevate the existing earnings at the cost of upcoming defaulted loans to enhance the 
profitability aspect in a market by utilising loan-loss provisions; such a credit policy is 
named a liberal policy or ‘pro-cyclical or lending policy’ (see: Gordy and Howells, 
2004; Louzis et al., 2012; Repullo and Suarez, 2013; and Adrian and Song Shin, 
2014). It should be noted that in this study ROE ratio is examined in non-dynamic 
panel static models and in a dynamic model reflecting the effect of the previous year, 
which is expected to have a negative sign in its relations to NPL.  
The NIM ratio is based on the annual margin profits, which are attained from the 
difference between interest income and expenses dominated by earning assets (Golin 
and Delhaise, 2013). Salas and Saurina (2002) state that if NIM has declined then the 
credit diversification policy could be modified, and these changes can make loan 
portfolios more risky, which in turn increases the probability of defaulted loans. The 
sign of this variable with no lag is unpredictable, yet with one lag the NIM ratio is 
anticipated to be negative with NPL.   
Since a bank is considered to be an intermediary between investors and borrowers that 
transforms the input of monetary sources to output quantities or products (see: Berger 
and Humphrey, 1997), the selected input-output variables to estimate efficiency 
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scores are total deposits, short-term funding (DSF), and operating expenses (OE), 
including non-interest and personal expenses; the output variable is net loans (NL) 
(see: Yudistira 2004; Bouchaddakh and Salah, 2005; EI-Gamal and Inanoglu, 2005; 
Sufian, 2006; Bader et al. 2008; El-Moussawi and Obied, 2010).  
In this study, bank efficiency is examined to detect how efficient the banks are at 
producing loans and, most importantly, to examine the relationship between 
efficiency and NPL. This in turn is instigated to investigate the management 
behaviours when directing NPL, which can be explained by ‘bad management’, ‘bad 
luck’, and ‘skimping’ hypotheses developed by Berger and DeYoung (1997). In the 
case of the ‘bad management’ and ‘bad luck’ hypotheses, the relationship between 
bank efficiency and NPL is negative for several reasons. For example, with the former 
hypothesis as an internal cause, the absence of management quality in monitoring 
loans expenses and collateral, results in decreasing the efficiency and increasing loan 
problems. The state of the ‘bad luck’ hypothesis is held due to external factors, such 
as a downturn in the macroeconomic aspects which may create additional costs in 
administrating NPL, which instils an adverse effect on bank efficiency. On the other 
hand, the ‘skimping’ hypothesis indicates a positive relationship between efficiency 
and NPL. In the ‘skimping’ policy position the bank tends to reduce the 
administrative expenses that are related to monitoring and controlling borrowers; such 
a procedure thus makes the bank efficient and the NPL appear to be not effected, 
especially in the short term. Over time the loan performance problem does, however, 
appear because of defaulted loans as a large number of debtors become negligent. In 
the present study the influence of a bank’s efficiency on NPL is also investigated in 
the present and on previous occasions. As noted by Berger and DeYoung (1997), a 
bank may be affected by all of these three hypotheses. For instance, ‘bad luck’ could 
occur as a result of economic crisis; at the same time bank management may make 
bad decisions by adopting a skimping policy to reduce costs; all of these procedures 
could result in an increase in NPL.             
6. Model Selection and Empirical Process 
After presenting the literature review of the available empirical studies and identifying 
the potential variables used and will be used in this study in exploring and examining 
NPL, this section focuses on model selection and empirical process. 
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6.1. Dynamic Panel Data (GMM) Estimator  
The dynamic panel approach or GMM models are utilised to estimate the factors that 
may determine NPL over time, which is proposed as GMM difference (GMM-DF) 
model developed by Holtz-Eakin et al. (1988) and by Arellano and Bond (1991); and 
GMM system (GMM-SYS) model, which is developed by Arellano and Bover 
(1995). After that, estimating efficient dynamic panel models for a small number of 
time-series observations or longitudinal data, which is proposed by Blundell and Bond 
(1998).  
The general description of the dynamic panel model is defined in the following 
equation:  XYZ = 	\XY,Z^_ + 	a T bYZ 	+ 	ηY +	dYZ, α < 1    (1) 
where  a T  symbolises the lag of estimate parameters; α represents the coefficient of 
the lagged dependent variable; 	bYZ , 	ηY , and dYZ  are described in the previous part 
related to panel data.    
The GMM model is based on the first difference transformation of equation 1, which 
can be rewritten as:  ∆XYZ = 	\∆XY,Z^_ + 	a T ∆bYZ 	+ ∆dYZ       (2) 
where ∆ signifies that the first difference operator component and dYZ component are 
not correlated over time [ (( dYZ	dY,Z^_ = 0 ]. The dependent variable with one 
lag,	∆XY,Z^_, is correlated with error term ∆dYZ, leading to a biased estimation of the 
model. The dependent variable with two lag or more,	∆XY,Z^j, is, however, correlated 
with ∆XY,Z^_  and not with ∆dYZ , which can be used as an instrument variable of 
equation three. This then proceeds to the orthogonality restrictions description, 
starting with the following equation of moment conditions: 
( XY,Z^k∆dYZ = 0	lQm	n = 3,… . , r	sPt	u ≥ 2     (3) 
The second case of moment conditions when exploratory variables are strictly 
exogenous, which implies that over all time those variables are not correlated with the 
error term, as in the following formula:  
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( bY,Z^k∆dYZ = 0	lQm	n = 3,… . , r	       (4) 
For the case when explanatory variables are weakly exogenous or predetermined, 
such as ( bYZdYZ ≠ 0	ySnℎ	n < u, then the	bYZ can be a valid instrument only with the 
specified lagged values, which involves the moment conditions as follows:  
( bY,Z^k∆dYZ = 0	lQm	n = 3,… . , r	sPt	u ≥ 2     (5) 
If {Y is the matrix element of instrumental variables then according to Bond (2002) 
the equation (5) can be rewritten as:  ( {′Y∆dYZ = 0    (6) 
The GMM model is built on moment conditions that diminish the criterion as 
expressed in the following equation: 
}~ = 	 _~ 	 ∆dYY~YÄ_ 	%~ 	 _~ 	 Y∆dY~YÄ_ 																																																							 (7)  
By utilising the weight matrix: 
%~ = 	 _~ 	 (YÅY)~YÄ_ ^_																																																																																		  (8) 
where Å is an individual specific matrix. The previous equations (3 and 8) form the 
basis of the GMM one-step estimator, which is efficient if the error terms are 
homoscedastic. Indeed, there are two types of GMM estimators: one-step and two-
step estimates. In addition, Windmeijer (2005) pointed out that the GMM two-step 
estimate with corrected errors asymptotically could achieve better results than the 
one-step estimator. The data sample of this study is, however, relatively small; the 
one-step GMM model is therefore preferred in the present study. Thus, in such a 
sample, the standard errors do not allow for additional variations to construct the 
weight matrix (Bond, 2002; Bond and Windmeijer, 2005; Windmeijer, 2005).  
In order to examine the autocorrelation, the Arellano-Bond approach is utilised with 
first-order (AR1) and second-order (AR2) serial correlation; the former is applied to 
detect the serial correlation in differenced error terms when given the following: ∆dYZ = 	 dYZ − dY,Z^_	, and      (9a)   
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∆dY,Z^_ = 	 dY,Z^_ − dY,Z^j      (9b)  
      
Both equations 9a and 9b share the  dY,Z^_ term. The later test is used to check the 
serial correlation in levels for first-order. Further, Sargan & Hansen joint tests are 
applied and reported after the GMM estimation to indicate the validity of instrumental 
variables with the objective of making sure that they are not endogenous to the 
differences of the error term4. 
In addition to applying the difference GMM estimator, this study applies the GMM 
system estimator; the latter differs from the former by exploiting additional moment 
conditions, r − 2, to the moment conditions in the first differences model. Blundell 
and Bond (1998) stated that the performance of the GMM system estimator could be 
less biased and more accurate, especially if	\ is large. The form of this estimator can 
be written in the following equation:  
( ÉYZ	∆XY,Z^_ = ( ÑY +	ÖYZ ∆XY,Z^_         
= ( XYZ −	\XY,Z^_ ∆XY,Z^_ = 0                 (10) 
6.2. Econometric Specification  
As presented above, Table 1 describes the utilised variables that may impact and 
determine the NPLs of the GCC banks, starting with the basic estimate model:    
!"#YZ = 	\!"#Y,Z^_ + 	 a_Ü$%&YZ^Ü_ÜÄá + ajÜ∆NO"YZ^Ü_ÜÄá + 	ηY + 	dYZ,											and 
  α < 1, S = 1,… . ,51, n = 1,… . ,7	             (11) 
where !"#YZ denotes the average of impaired or default loans to gross loans per year, 
which represents the ratio of NPL to gross loans; this is suggested by Louzis et al. 
(2012) 5. The estimated α of !"#Y,Z^_ should be positive; $%& measures the ratio of 
																																								 																					
4 Some lags are invalid as instruments; for example, if XY,Z^j as an instrument is endogenous to the 
differences in the error term that leads to an invalid instrument (Roodman, 2009).   
5 Many studies employed the transformed variable through truncated or logit transformation of NPL 
ratio as dependent variable (for example, Salas and Saurina, 2002 and Espinoza and Prasad, 2010). The 
present study does, however, utilise the numeral of NPL ratio without transformation because it shows 
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RWA to total assets. This variable is utilised under the assumption of weak exogeneity 
with bank-level factors, which indicates that endogeneity and potential correlation 
matter with error term over time (Salas and Saurina, 2002; Louzis et al., 2012). To 
avoid the correlation problem, such a variable is therefore computed with two lags or 
more for the first difference transformed form in equation 1. The last variable in the 
basic estimate model is that of real GDP growth rate, and although	∆GDP is assumed 
to be strictly exogenous, the GDP growth and the other additional variables (treated as 
predetermined) in the following models are instrumented by themselves ‘IV-style’ 
(Roodman, 2009).     
A selection of variables was added to the basic model to account for the micro - and 
macro - level factors; initially, this is to investigate the relationship between bank 
efficiency and NPL in the effects on the present and previous year. It is worth noting 
that those selected variables are estimated in different equations, due to the number of 
observations, which is relatively small and turns to cause technical and statistic 
problems. The following equation is estimated: 
!"#YZ = \!"#Y,Z^_ + a_Ü$%&YZ^Ü_ÜÄá + ajÜ∆NO"YZ^Ü_ÜÄá + açÜ(GGHIJ,KLJYZ +aéÜ(GGHIJ,KLJYZ^Ü_ÜÄá +Y + 	dYZ																																				    (12)  
where (GGHIJ,KLJ	separately	represents the efficiency scores that are computed by 
utilising the output distance function via the DEA under variable return to scale 
assumption. In addition, to rationalise the efficiency scores that are obtained through 
the DEA method and to conduct the robustness check, the stochastic frontier approach 
(SFA) is utilised by applying Cob-Douglas production function (see chapters two and 
three). After that and to examine the non-oil GDP growth impacts on NPL, the 
following formula is estimated:  
!"#YZ = \!"#Y,Z^_ + a_Ü$%&YZ^Ü_ÜÄá + açÜ∆NO"~ó~óYòYZ^Ü_ÜÄá + ηY + 	dYZ			(13)  
In addition, in order to test the hypothesis of a bank’s profitability effect on NPL, 
bank-level variables are included with the basic model as follows:  
!"#YZ = \!"#Y,Z^_ + a_Ü$%&YZ^Ü_ÜÄá + ajÜ∆NO"YZ^Ü_ÜÄá + açÜbôYZ^Ü_ÜÄá +Y + 	dYZ		 (14) 																																								 																																								 																																								 																																								 														
more significant and precise results. Furthermore, Salas and Saurina (2002) pointed out that the 
transformation of dependent variable would not be suitable for the GMM process.           
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where  bô represents bank-level variables, which are ROE and NIM. Accordingly and 
corresponding to the impact of bank-type and assets-size on NPL, other variables 
related to banking-sector development are tested in the econometric specification, 
which is written as:  
!"#YZ = \!"#Y,Z^_ + a_Ü$%&YZ^Ü_ÜÄá + ajÜ∆NO"YZ^Ü_ÜÄá + açÜ∆böYZ^Ü_ÜÄá +Y + 	dYZ				(15)  
where ∆bö denotes the asset growth of IB, IW, and CB.  
The equation 16 captures the dynamic effect of construction and real-estate sector 
financing for IB and CB on NPL: 
!"#YZ = \!"#Y,Z^_ + a_Ü$%&YZ^Ü_ÜÄá + ajÜ∆NO"YZ^Ü_ÜÄá + açÜ∆bõYZ^Ü_ÜÄá +Y + 	dYZ		(16)  
where ∆bõ symbolises the growth of the real estate and construction aspects of the 
financing for IB and CB.  
Finally, in terms of Islamic finance modes, it is essential for this study to examine the 
relationship between NPLs and Islamic finance contracts, such as PLS contracts and 
FID contracts. Thus, the following equation aims to investigate such a dynamic 
relationship between those variables: 
!"#YZ = \!"#Y,Z^_ + a_Ü$%&YZ^Ü_ÜÄá + ajÜ∆NO"YZ^Ü
_
ÜÄá + açÜ∆:G;úùK,LûHYZ^Ü
j
ÜÄ_ +Y + 	dYZ	 
(17)  
where IFM)¢£,§•¶ denotes the individual change in PLS and FID contracts.  
6.3. Data and Sample 
The annual financial statements of 51 banks, including IB, IW and CB, from all the 
GCC countries, namely Bahrain, Kuwait, Qatar, Saudi Arabia and the UAE (with the 
exception of Oman due to the absence of Islamic banking in the country for the period 
in question), for seven years from 2005 to 2011 were acquired from Bankscope under 
the International Accounting Standard (IAS) in US dollars. It should be noted that 
foreign banks that have branches, which operate, in the GCC region are excluded 
from the sample.  
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The sampled banks are therefore limited to fourteen domestic IB and thirty-eight 
domestic CB, which are comprised of: 
(i) Two IB and two CB that provide Shari’ah-compliant windows or IW, and three 
CBs in Bahrain; 
(ii) Three IB and five CB in Kuwait; 
(iii) Two IB and four CB that provide Shari’ah-compliant window or IW, and one 
conventional bank in Qatar; 
(iv) Three IB and nine CB that provide Shari’ah-compliant windows or IW in Saudi 
Arabia; 
(v) Four IB, three CB that provide Shari’ah-compliant windows or IW, and eleven CB 
in the UAE. 
Table 2 displays the summary descriptive statistics of the variables. 
 
Table 2: Descriptive Statistics of Variables 
Variable Mean St. Dev. Min. Max.  
Dynamic panel data (GMM) of all banks 
NPL 4.90 7.60 0       56.86 
RWA 72.27 24.99 0 133.37 
ROE 12.03 55.94 -946.11       52.77 
NIM 3.49 1.37 1.2       13.53 
DSF 17048.6 19062.6 98.40       103478 
OE 1069.52 4524.00 4.50       39960.1 
NL 13284.2 15251.5 50.68      89608.5           
lnDSF 9.051 1.332 4.589       11.55 
lnOE 5.258 1.45 1.504       10.60 
lnNL 8.84 1.312 3.997       11.46 (GGHIJ 62.17 17.08 5.38 100 (GGKLJ 81.98 6.79 38.24 96.80 
∆IBA 5.19 16.33 -17.43    70.83 
∆IWA 71.92 147.40 -14.25    709.70 
∆IBIWA 13.46 27.49 -10.74      143.13 
∆CBA -0.50 2.30 -6.68    9.25 
∆RECIB 47.52 39.82 -26.23    135.60 
∆REC 31.21 28.15 -9.64    98.25 
∆IM 23.45 25.77 -16.11    134.80 
∆PLS 174.10 936.62 -46.34    5415.93 
∆FID -0.318 2.231 -8.653    5.191 
∆GDP 5.52 5.16 -5.2        18.6 
∆Non-oil 
GDP 
6.37 8.60 -7.2 36.1 
Notes: DSF, OE, NL and the natural logarithm of their number (ln) are utilised to compute efficiency 
scores; they are presented in USD million. The minimum ratio of ROE is shown by the Gulf Bank 
(KSC) in Kuwait during 2008.    
In addition, all of the annual variables utilised to compute efficiency scores are 
converted to suitable real prices according to the GDP deflator in 2005. Other micro- 
and macro-economic variables are drawn from the Economist Intelligence Unit, the 
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Islamic Research and Training Institute (a member of the Islamic Development Bank) 
through its website, the World Databank through the website of the World Bank 
Group, and The Banker (various issues).  
7. Results and Discussion  
7.1 GMM Results     
The GMM analysis is conducted to analyse the obtained findings that describe the 
relationship between NPL and the independent variables, which are bank-level and 
macro-level variables, including the impact of Islamic financing on NPL in the GCC 
commercial banks, by estimating five models. These models include OLS, two-stage 
least squares (2SLS), FE panel data, GMM-difference, and GMM-system. All of these 
econometrics specifications are utilised in order to check the robustness test for each 
of the estimated coefficients in terms of direction and statistical significance6. In 
addition, the Arellano-Bond p-values test of autocorrelation7. All of these p-values are 
reported in all of the estimated models, along with the p-value of the Hansen test, 
which is estimated for the validity of instrumental variables. 
In this model, NPL and RWA are utilised as endogenous bank-level variables via 
2SLS and GMM estimates with two and three lags. Thus, in the 2SLS estimate, the 
NPL-dependent variable with one lag is instrumented. Although in the GMM 
estimates (as described in section 4), RWA is assumed to be a weak exogenous bank-
level variable, meaning that the decision-makers of a bank’s management take into 
consideration the future expected amount of NPL; the other independent variables that 
related to macro-level are treated to be under predetermined assumption. Variables 
associated with bank-specific or micro-level factors are therefore predetermined 
																																								 																					
6 2SLS is preferred in order to maximise the sample size, especially in the case of short panel, with 
levels estimator through Anderson and Hsiao (1981) estimator, because of the instrumental variable is 
instrumented with lags rather than differences (Roodman, 2009: 105-106). 
Again as reported for panel data estimates, a multicollinearity problem is detected through VIF in all 
dynamic estimators and it is found that for each explanatory variables the value of VIF is less than 
1.30, with the exception of efficiency scores as the values of VIF are about 4.50 for DEA estimate and 
around 2.80 for SFA estimate; this indicates that there is no multicollinearity (Greene, 2007: E5-18). 
The test is shown in the appendix. 
7  Namely AR(1) for first-order, is conducted to detect the correlation of residuals through the 
differences in error terms, which must be less than 1%  to reject the hypothesis that the random error 
process is correlated through individual, and AR(2) for second order is estimated to test the 
autocorrelation in first-order levels. The p-value here must be more than 10%, thus, to accept the 
hypothesis that error terms are autocorrelated as a full distribution but not through levels, see Roodman 
(2009:119-121).  
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(Salas and Saurina, 2002; Louzis et al., 2012). In other words, they are instrumented 
by themselves ‘IV-style’ (Roodman, 2009).         
In all estimated models from four to twenty, the coefficient of the lagged dependent 
variable is positive and statistically significant in most of these models, which have a 
coefficient of less than one, which is in line with Salas and Saurina’s (2002) study. 
Such findings imply that NPL are likely to be increased due to previous NPL.     
In Table 3, Model 1 and Model 2 represent the baseline specification and the 
estimator model, including non-oil GPD growth as an independent variable. The 
baseline estimate shows a significant p-value of first-order autocorrelation and no 
serial correlation in the second-order, implying that the estimators are consistent; the 
Hansen test confirms the hypothesis that the instrumental variables are valid. The 
coefficients of explanatory variables have the anticipated sign, and they are significant 
in all estimators with the exception of the coefficient of GDP growth in the GMM-
system estimator. The p-value of second-order serial correlation suggests, however, 
that the GMM estimators of Model 2 are not consistent; the findings of this model 
therefore cannot be relied on.         
By looking at all of the estimators of variables for RWA and GDP in Table 3, it can 
be seen that the coefficient of RWA is positive with not more than 0.18 and that is 
significant in most specifications. The implication of this variable is that NPL are 
likely to increase due to increasing the previous credit risk of banks’ portfolios. In 
terms of macroeconomic variables, as can be seen from the results, the GDP 
coefficient is negative and significant in several models, suggesting that a rise in the 
real GDP growth in the previous year leads to a decrease in the NPL from 10% to 
20%. In addition, the relationship between the lagged variable of non-oil GDP growth 
and NPL is negative; it is also in line with the expectations of this study, yet this result 
could be biased and misleading.   
In terms of bank-specific variables, Table 4 depicts the results of Model 3 and Model 
4 for bank level financial ratios. As the results indicate, according to the p-values of 
AR(1) and AR(2) and the Hansen test, it is presumed that both models are consistent 
at 10% for AR(1) in GMM-system model; the instrumental variables are also valid. 
The coefficient of the performance variable, namely ROE, is negative and significant 
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with NPL at about 2%, which is in line with the expectations of this study. This result 
implies the presence of previous bad decisions on the part of bank management, 
which prompts a decrease in bank performance and thus results in an increase of NPL. 
Likewise, the profitability ratio NIM has a negative and significant impact of 
approximately 2% on NPL, suggesting that the modification in credit policy due to the 
previous decline in NIM could raise the risk-level in the loans portfolio, which in turn 
increases NPL.    
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Table 3: Baseline Model (Model 1) and Estimated Model (Model 2)  
 Model 1 (Baseline estimate) Model 2 
 OLS 2SLS FE GMM-DF 
GMM-
SYS OLS 2SLS FE 
GMM-
DF 
GMM-
SYS 
Variables NPL NPL NPL NPL NPL NPL NPL NPL NPL NPL !"#$% 0.934*** 0.948*** 0.509*** 0.427** 0.925*** 0.946*** 0.954*** 0.946*** 0.521*** 0.933*** 
 (0.027) (0.054) (0.124) (0.197) (0.0501) (0.0225) (0.0529) (0.0225) (0.188) (0.0468) &'($% 0.0179** 0.0174* 0.034*** 0.0652** 0.084*** 0.0182** 0.0156* 0.0182** 0.083*** 0.084*** 
 (0.008) (0.0087) (0.0082) (0.0328) (0.0241) (0.0082) (0.0085) (0.0082) (0.0309) (0.0238) ∆*+"$% -0.08*** -0.065** -0.16*** -0.16** -0.0494      
 (0.025) (0.0277) (0.0484) (0.0671) (0.0379)      ∆,-, − -/0	*+"$%      -0.060** -0.068** -0.060** -0.064** -0.047* 
      (0.0245) (0.0303) (0.0245) (0.0266) (0.0245) 
Constant -0.134 -0.0936 1.049  -5.15*** -0.274 0.118 -0.274  -5.23*** 
 (0.69) (0.821) (0.814)  (1.997) (0.702) (0.886) (0.702)  (2.000) 
           
Observations 283 232 283 232 283 283 232 283 232 283 
R-squared 0.825 0.805 0.346   0.826 0.808    
Number of banks   51 50 51   51 50 51 
No. of instruments    31 42    31 42 
Hansen test p-value    0.29 0.41    0.13 0.29 
A-B AR(1) test p-value    0.00 0.07    0.01 0.08 
A-B AR(2) test p-value    0.17 0.17    0.08 0.12 
IV-2SLS 
Instrumented: !"#$% Instrumented: !"#$% 
Instruments: &'($% ∆*+"$% !"#$2 &'($2 Instruments: &'($% ∆,-, − -/0	*+"$% !"#$2 &'($2 
Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses; *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. 
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Table 4: Model 3 and Model 4- Bank Level (Financial Ratio) 
 Model 3 Model 4 
 OLS 2SLS FE GMM-DF GMM-SYS OLS 2SLS FE GMM-DF GMM-SYS 
Variables NPL NPL NPL NPL NPL NPL NPL NPL NPL NPL !"#$% 0.913*** 0.945*** 0.473*** 0.454*** 0.907*** 0.934*** 0.949*** 0.508*** 0.420** 0.917*** 
 (0.038) (0.0517) (0.122) (0.171) (0.059) (0.028) (0.056) (0.13) (0.199) (0.052) &'($% 0.0167** 0.0174** 0.028*** 0.0590** 0.079*** 0.0190** 0.0196** 0.034*** 0.0647* 0.076*** 
 (0.008) (0.009) (0.007) (0.0282) (0.023) (0.0084) (0.009) (0.008) (0.034) (0.022) &34$% -0.019*** -0.019*** -0.021*** -0.018*** -0.017***      
 (0.0011) (0.001) (0.0012) (0.0011) (0.001)      ∆*+"$% -0.072*** -0.0562** -0.161*** -0.153** -0.0424 -0.082*** -0.0694** -0.160*** -0.157** -0.0521 
 (0.0246) (0.0277) (0.0486) (0.067) (0.038) (0.024) (0.0273) (0.049) (0.066) (0.036) !56$%      -0.161** -0.235** -0.193 -1.145*** -0.329** 
      (0.0791) (0.0947) (0.262) (0.343) (0.144) 
Constant 0.242 0.0615 1.867**  -4.555** 0.342 0.543 1.709  -3.431* 
 (0.693) (0.789) (0.778)  (1.955) (0.721) (0.884) (1.345)  (1.75) 
           
Observations 283 232 283 232 283 283 232 283 232 283 
R-squared 0.847 0.830 0.462   0.825 0.806 0.346   
Number of banks   51 50 51   51 50 51 
No. of instruments    32 42    32 43 
Hansen test p-value    0.30 0.50    0.31 0.56 
A-B AR(1) test p-value    0.02 0.10    0.00 0.08 
A-B AR(2) test p-value    0.31 0.19    0.14 0.16 
IV-2SLS Instrumented: !"#$% Instrumented: !"#$% Instruments: &'($% &34$% ∆*+"$% !"#$2 &'($2 Instruments: &'($% !56$% ∆*+"$% !"#$2 &'($2 
Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses; *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. 
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With regard to the link between bank performance and NPL, the findings through 
banks efficiency scores as modelled by Model 5 and Model 6 based on DEA and SFA 
are presented in Table 5; as can be seen AR(1) and AR(2) results guarantee the 
consistency of estimators, while the Hansen test also asserts the validity of the utilised 
instrumental variables. The not-lagged coefficient of efficiency is negatively related 
with NPLs and statistically significant in all of the estimated models, with the 
exception of the GMM-DF estimate, suggesting that a decline in a bank’s efficiency 
contributes to an increase of around 10% in NPL. This finding evidences for ‘bad 
management’ hypothesis in the GCC’s commercial banks, which could reflect the 
management quality; this result in turn corresponds with the panel data findings in the 
earlier section. This adverse impact could point to the ‘bad luck’ hypothesis in the 
sense of external factors relating to macroeconomic variables affecting the GCC’s 
bank performance8. The one year lagged coefficient of efficiency is, however, linked 
to NPL with positive sign, which should be considered as an indication of the 
‘skimping’ hypothesis, signifying to bank policy in reducing credit administration 
expenses to increase the level of efficiency. The results do, however, indicate that a 
failure to monitor debtors in the previous year led to an increase in NPL. In addition, 
Model 6 is conducted to ensure the validity and direction of efficiency scores that 
were obtained via the DEA approach and utilised in Model 5.  As can be seen in table 
5, the coefficients of the SFA efficiency scores are not significant and slightly higher 
than the DEA coefficients; however, they are in the same directions. 
																																								 																					
8 In 2006 the stock market of Gulf countries dropped; they then recovered from 22% to 60% in 2007. 
As a result of the financial global crisis in 2008, the market declined by 29% to 73%. Furthermore, in 
2008 the central banks pressed liquidity to the financial system directly through long-term government 
deposits and indirectly through repos (see: Khamis et al., 2010: 10-29). 
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Table 5: NPL and Bank Efficiency (DEA and SFA) – Model 5 and Model 6 
 Model 5 Model 6 
 OLS 2SLS FE GMM-DF GMM-SYS OLS 2SLS FE GMM-DF GMM-SYS 
Variables NPL NPL NPL NPL NPL NPL NPL NPL NPL NPL !"#$% 0.923*** 0.944*** 0.503*** 0.409** 0.908*** 0.929*** 0.949*** 0.517*** 0.387* 0.909*** 
 (0.0237) (0.0554) (0.113) (0.195) (0.0391) (0.0258) (0.0597) (0.120) (0.198) (0.0387) &'($% 0.0156* 0.0140 0.032*** 0.0362 0.075*** 0.0171** 0.0151* 0.030*** 0.0343 0.081*** 
 (0.0088) (0.0086) (0.0084) (0.0321) (0.0236) (0.0082) (0.0084) (0.0074) (0.0345) (0.0254) )**+,- -0.100** -0.102* -0.098* -0.0629 -0.089**      
 (0.0407) (0.0515) (0.0512) (0.0534) (0.0450)      )**$%+,- 0.0908** 0.0930* 0.0738* 0.107** 0.0657      
 (0.0366) (0.0508) (0.0399) (0.0455) (0.0406)      )**./-      -0.198* -0.192 -0.172 -0.164 -0.219 
      (0.114) (0.167) (0.132) (0.139) (0.138) )**$%./-      0.185* 0.183 0.222* 0.284* 0.136 
      (0.106) (0.168) (0.132) (0.168) (0.108) ∆12"$% -0.078*** -0.0597** -0.164*** -0.159** -0.0539 -0.085*** -0.0687** -0.155*** -0.173** -0.0629* 
 (0.0268) (0.0291) (0.0497) (0.0693) (0.0376) (0.0247) (0.0268) (0.0492) (0.0682) (0.0372) 
Constant 0.785 0.862 2.898  -2.743* 1.071 0.854 -2.857  1.999 
 (0.940) (1.302) (3.305)  (1.552) (2.274) (2.951) (5.453)  (3.009) 
Observations 283 232 283 232 283 283 232 283 232 283 
R-squared 0.834 0.814 0.379   0.832 0.811 0.382   
Number of banks   51 50 51   51 50 51 
No. of instruments    33 44    33 44 
Hansen test p-value    0.30 0.23    0.38 0.26 
A-B AR(1) test p-value    0.00 0.06    0.00 0.05 
A-B AR(2) test p-value    0.25 0.19    0.22 0.13 
IV-2SLS 
Instrumented: !"#$% Instrumented: !"#$% 
Instruments: &'($% )**+,- )**$%+,- ∆12"$% !"#$3 &'($3 Instruments: &'($% )**./- )**$%./- ∆12"$% !"#$3 &'($3 
Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses; *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
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With regard to the macro-level sectorial financing variables, tables 6 and 7 present the 
estimated coefficients for growth rates of MI and the growth rates of REC and the 
REC of IB. Table 6 presents the results for macro level for Model 7, which includes 
manufacturing and industry financing variables, while Table 7 depicts the results for 
macro level Model 8 and Model 9 including the real estate and construction financing 
variables of CB and IB. In these models, these stated variables are utilised without 
lag, whereas Table 8 shows the estimation for a model with one-year lag variables. 
For GMM estimate models, the p-value of AR(1) is significant, indicating that there is 
no serial correlation in AR(2), except the GMM-difference estimated in Model 8. This 
lack of correlation demonstrates the consistency of the estimators, as given by the 
result of the Hansen test, which shows that the instrument variables are valid. It 
should be noted that the sign of all of the sectorial financing variables meets the 
expectations of the study, excluding the REC variable with one year lag in Model 11 
in which coefficient direction varies over the five estimations. Thus, such a result 
could not be relied on. When comparing the coefficients of MI and REC in models 7 
and 8, the results show that they are relatively similar, implying that increasing the MI 
and REC financing growth in the GCC commercial banks by 1% leads to a decrease 
of the NPL by about 2%. Similarly, in the GMM-DF estimate the coefficient of 
RECIB is statistically significant and has a negative impact on NPL. 
These findings demonstrate that in the GCC countries there is a substantial interaction 
between the real GDP growth and business cycle in the economy in relation to the real 
estate and construction sectors. For instance, in 2008 the financing share of these 
sectors to total financing in the whole commercial banks and in IB was as follows: 
7.3% and 5.6% in Saudi Arabia; 12.9% and 25.7% in the UAE; 26.2% and 11.3% in 
Bahrain; 18.4% and 38.3% in Qatar; and 31.4% and 22.1% in Kuwait. Noticeably, the 
risk exposure level of REC in IB is higher in the UAE and Qatar than the other 
sampled countries (Khamis et al., 2010: 69)9.  
With regard to the RECIB variable with one-year lag in Model 10, the coefficient of 
RECIB has remained negative and significant in the GMM-DF estimate with 
approximately a 10% level of significance. The results of this variable, without lag 																																								 																					
9 Large banks in most of the GCC countries are more exposed to real estate and construction financing; 
further, there is a large concentration of real estate projects by investment funds (see: Khamis et al., 
2010: 10 and 57).  
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and with one year lag, is in line with the earlier panel data findings, supporting the 
fact that the financing for IB is more related to REC sector, which increases the risk-
exposure level. Furthermore, Khamis et al. (2010) and El Alaoui et al. (2015) study 
state that in 2009, the performance of IB was affected by the crisis in the real 
economy in relation to the real estate market; deterioration in this market thus 
increases NPL. It is therefore suggested that diversification is a crucial step for IB by 
focusing more on increasing the financing to other sectors that are more engaged with 
the real economy due to the objective of reducing their risk exposure, such as 
manufacturing and industry sectors, which relate to the real economy by creating 
value added through jobs and wealth. Hence, value-added-oriented sectors, including 
manufacturing industries, should remain an important financing area for IB as 
expected by the aspirational view put forward by the Islamic moral economy (Asutay, 
2012). Given that such sectors relate to generating wealth via the embedding of 
financing in the real economy, it is believed that the propensity of failure is less than 
that of the real estate sector10. 
Table 6: Macro-Level Model 7 (including Manufacturing and Industry 
Financing Variable of GCC Commercial Banks) 
 Model 7 
 OLS 2SLS FE GMM-DF GMM-SYS 
Variables NPL NPL NPL NPL NPL !"#$% 0.929*** 0.945*** 0.501*** 0.369* 0.920*** 
 (0.0262) (0.0538) (0.127) (0.189) (0.0503) &'($% 0.0153* 0.0119 0.030*** 0.051 0.078*** 
 (0.0082) (0.0085) (0.0083) (0.0336) (0.0236) ∆*+"$% -0.059** -0.0327 -0.096** -0.0999* -0.0390 
 (0.0232) (0.0267) (0.0444) (0.0534) (0.0378) ∆,- -0.0176* -0.026*** -0.022*** -0.026*** -0.0121 
 (0.0089) (0.0095) (0.0076) (0.0080) (0.0081) 
Constant 0.318 0.713 1.392  -4.553** 
 (0.677) (0.786) (0.874)  (1.930) 
      
Observations 283 232 283 232 283 
R-squared 0.827 0.810 0.360   
Number of banks   51 50 51 
No. of instruments    32 43 
Hansen test p-value    0.26 0.32 
A-B AR(1) test p-value    0.01 0.08 
A-B AR(2) test p-value    0.24 0.23 
IV-2SLS Instrumented: !"#$% Instruments: &'($% ∆,- ∆*+"$% !"#$. &'($. 
Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses; *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
																																								 																					
10 Indeed, over the current study period the financing average to total financing of the manufacturing 
sector has presented the lower level among other financing sectors, barely reaching 12% in 2008 (see: 
Figure 4 in the appendix).  
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Table 7: Macro-Level Model 8 and Model 9  
(Including the Real Estate and Construction Financing Variable of CB and IB) 
 Model 8 Model 9 
 OLS 2SLS FE GMM-DF GMM-SYS OLS 2SLS FE GMM-DF GMM-SYS 
Variables NPL NPL NPL NPL NPL NPL NPL NPL NPL NPL !"#$% 0.930*** 0.948*** 0.452*** 0.105 0.921*** 0.928*** 0.942*** 0.478*** 0.290 0.922*** 
 (0.0294) (0.0575) (0.116) (0.240) (0.0512) (0.0273) (0.0567) (0.118) (0.234) (0.0492) &'($% 0.0140* 0.0137 0.024*** -0.016 0.074*** 0.014* 0.014 0.026*** 0.029 0.078*** 
 (0.0082) (0.0091) (0.008) (0.054) (0.022) (0.0075) (0.0085) (0.0085) (0.0518) (0.0232) ∆*+"$% -0.0366 -0.0284 -0.105** -0.156*** -0.0164 -0.0625** -0.0453 -0.119*** -0.156*** -0.0428 
 (0.0304) (0.0367) (0.0426) (0.0529) (0.0409) (0.0243) (0.0298) (0.0411) (0.0582) (0.0368) ∆&,- -0.021*** -0.017** -0.035*** -0.048*** -0.016**      
 (0.0067) (0.0068) (0.0096) (0.0181) (0.0068)      ∆&,-./      -0.0089** -0.009* -0.013** -0.0153* -0.0042 
      (0.0044) (0.0047) (0.0059) (0.0092) (0.0039) 
Constant 0.515 0.453 2.670***  -4.177** 0.422 0.426 2.053**  -4.638** 
 (0.671) (0.818) (0.967)  (1.826) (0.645) (0.812) (0.961)  (1.933) 
           
Observations 283 232 283 232 283 283 232 283 232 283 
R-squared 0.830 0.809 0.411   0.827 0.807 0.369   
Number of banks   51 50 51   51 50 51 
No. of instruments    32 43    32 43 
Hansen test p-value    0.09 0.22    0.19 0.41 
A-B AR(1) test p-
value  
 
 0.11 0.08  
 
 0.00 0.07 
A-B AR(2) test p-
value  
 
 0.17 0.20  
 
 0.17 0.16 
IV-2SLS Instrumented: !"#$% Instrumented: !"#$% Instruments: &'($% ∆&,- ∆*+"$% !"#$0 &'($0 Instruments: &'($% ∆&,-./   ∆*+"$% !"#$0 &'($0 
Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses; *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
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Table 8: Macro-Level Model 10 and Model 11 
(Including the Real Estate and Construction Financing Variable of CB and IB with Lagged Variables) 
 Model 10 Model 11 
 OLS 2SLS FE GMM-DF GMM-SYS OLS 2SLS FE GMM-DF GMM-SYS 
Variables NPL NPL NPL NPL NPL NPL NPL NPL NPL NPL !"#$% 0.932*** 0.948*** 0.496*** 0.382* 0.925*** 0.935*** 0.948*** 0.508*** 0.386** 0.924*** 
 (0.0288) (0.0561) (0.122) (0.203) (0.0520) (0.0248) (0.0488) (0.124) (0.195) (0.0476) &'($% 0.0175** 0.0170* 0.032*** 0.0604* 0.084*** 0.0165** 0.0131* 0.034*** 0.0594* 0.077*** 
 (0.0086) (0.0091) (0.0083) (0.0332) (0.0249) (0.0082) (0.0076) (0.0082) (0.0309) (0.0241) ∆&,-./$% -0.00310 -0.00141 -0.0065* -0.0077* -0.00071      
 (0.0044) (0.005) (0.0034) (0.0043) (0.0046)      ∆*+"$% -0.075*** -0.063** -0.14*** -0.147** -0.0489 -0.12*** -0.12*** -0.15*** -0.15** -0.083** 
 (0.0252) (0.0289) (0.0474) (0.0623) (0.0382) (0.0251) (0.0271) (0.0500) (0.0630) (0.0323) ∆&,-$%      0.016*** 0.024*** -0.000664 -0.0054 0.0107 
      (0.00598) (0.00684) (0.00721) (0.00602) (0.00679) 
Constant 0.0293 -0.0101 1.435*  -5.120** -0.388 -0.244 1.063  -4.822** 
 (0.811) (0.985) (0.785)  (2.171) (0.708) (0.758) (0.822)  (1.985) 
           
Observations 283 232 283 232 283 283 232 283 232 283 
R-squared 0.825 0.805 0.351   0.828 0.812 0.346   
Number of Bank   51 50 51   51 50 51 
No. of instruments    32 43    32 43 
Hansen test p-value    0.19 0.50    0.29 0.24 
A-B AR(1) test p-value    0.01 0.08    0.00 0.07 
A-B AR(2) test p-value    0.19 0.18    0.18 0.18 
IV-2SLS Instrumented: !"#$% Instrumented: !"#$% Instruments: &'($% ∆&,-./$% ∆*+"$% !"#$0 &'($0 Instruments: &'($% ∆&,-$%  ∆*+"$% !"#$0 &'($0 
Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses; *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. 
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Turning to the macro-level factors of a bank’s structural and organisational-
development, tables 9 and 10 represent the estimated results for the assets growth 
according to bank types as seen in models 12, 13, 14, and 15. As the results show, the 
p-values of first-order and second-order autocorrelations prove the consistency of 
these estimators. In addition, the Hansen test values illustrate the validity of 
instrumental variables. Starting with the asset growth of IB, the coefficient shows a 
positive and significant relationship between IBA and NPL, demonstrating that an 
increase in IBA produces a rise in NPL by about 3%. This implies that the IBs may 
have less ability to diversify in financing portfolios, which results in an increased 
vulnerability for risk. The coefficient of the IWA (asset growth of CBs with IW) is 
also positive but with a small coefficient and not a statistically significant result. With 
regard to IBIWA variable (Shari’ah-compliant assets growth), this again shows a 
positive link with NPL; nonetheless, it is not significant in all of the estimators. In 
contrast to the adverse impacts, the relationship between CBA growth and NPLs is 
negative and significant in terms of all of the estimators, which specifies that an 
increase in the growth of Shari’ah-compliant finance leads to a decline in NPLs by 
around 30%. This result then implies that these CB have more capacity when it comes 
to diversification in financing projects, which in turn decreases the level of risk-
taking.  
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Table 9: Model 12 and Model 13 
Assets Growth for IBs and IWs 
 Model 12 Model 13 
 OLS 2SLS FE 
GMM-
DF 
GMM-
SYS OLS 2SLS FE 
GMM-
DF 
GMM-
SYS 
Variables NPL NPL NPL NPL NPL NPL NPL NPL NPL NPL !"#$% 0.943*** 0.935*** 0.451*** 0.323* 0.918*** 0.947*** 0.937*** 0.492*** 0.341* 0.920*** 
 (0.0351) (0.0528) (0.147) (0.195) (0.0500) (0.0278) (0.0446) (0.131) (0.187) (0.0381) &'($% 0.0219** 0.0205** 0.0390** 0.0872** 0.095*** 0.0202** 0.0192** 0.039*** 0.0782** 0.0812** 
 (0.0095) (0.0095) (0.0158) (0.0429) (0.0358) (0.0086) (0.0093) (0.0145) (0.0367) (0.0320) ∆*+"$% -0.08*** -0.08*** -0.22*** -0.24*** -0.085** -0.07*** -0.067** -0.18*** -0.18*** -0.0653* 
 (0.0257) (0.0258) (0.0744) (0.0777) (0.0399) (0.024) (0.0260) (0.0513) (0.0633) (0.0361) ∆,-($% 0.0252** 0.0289** 0.0171 0.0208 0.0346**      
 (0.0117) (0.0122) (0.0196) (0.0150) (0.0147)      ∆,'($%      0.00274 0.00328 0.00217 0.00236 0.00298 
      (0.003) (0.0032) (0.0039) (0.0039) (0.0034) 
Constant -0.441 -0.325 1.241  -6.025** -0.458 -0.395 0.816  -5.07* 
 (0.812) (0.882) (1.208)  (2.929) (0.802) (0.945) (1.103)  (2.735) 
           
Observations 239 232 239 188 239 246 232 246 195 246 
R-squared 0.806 0.808 0.308   0.808 0.809 0.336   
Number of banks   51 50 51   51 50 51 
No. of instruments    30 41    32 43 
Hansen test p-value    0.19 0.27    0.33 0.49 
A-B AR(1) test p-
value  
 
 0.00 0.06 
   0.00 0.05 
A-B AR(2) test p-
value  
 
 0.84 0.90 
   0.82 0.49 
IV-2SLS 
Instrumented: !"#$% Instrumented: !"#$% 
Instruments: &'($% ∆,-($%  ∆*+"$% !"#$. &'($. Instruments: &'($% ∆,'($%  ∆*+"$% !"#$. &'($. 
Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses; *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. 
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Table 10: Model 14 and Model 15 
Shari’ah-Compliant Assets to Total Assets Growth and Assets of CB to Total Assets Growth Models 
 
 Model 14 Model 15 
 OLS 2SLS FE 
GMM-
DF 
GMM-
SYS OLS 2SLS FE 
GMM-
DF 
GMM-
SYS 
Variables NPL NPL NPL NPL NPL NPL NPL NPL NPL NPL !"#$% 0.935*** 0.927*** 0.421*** 0.271 0.905*** 0.943*** 0.940*** 0.399** 0.151 0.915*** 
 (0.0294) (0.0423) (0.134) (0.196) (0.0365) (0.0424) (0.0608) (0.160) (0.192) (0.0594) &'($% 0.0223** 0.0208* 0.0384** 0.0796* 0.0951** 0.0223** 0.0207** 0.036*** 0.0413 0.096*** 
 (0.0107) (0.0108) (0.0158) (0.0413) (0.0389) (0.0095) (0.0095) (0.0135) (0.0430) (0.0341) *+"$% -0.09*** -0.09*** -0.23*** -0.29** -0.093** -0.07*** -0.07*** -0.27*** -0.36*** -0.077* 
 (0.0314) (0.0293) (0.0887) (0.116) (0.0450) (0.0259) (0.0272) (0.0774) (0.102) (0.0407) ∆,-,'($% 0.0185 0.0199 0.0351 0.0358 0.0246      
 (0.0198) (0.0199) (0.026) (0.0268) (0.0237)      ∆/-($%      -0.195* -0.199* -0.38*** -0.49*** -0.279** 
      (0.106) (0.116) (0.139) (0.160) (0.126) 
Constant -0.511 -0.39 1.24  -6.09* -0.504 -0.395 1.784  -6.147** 
 (0.93) (1.01) (1.191)  (3.242) (0.831) (0.896) (1.120)  (2.823) 
           
Observations 239 232 239 188 239 239 232 239 188 239 
R-squared 0.807 0.809 0.337   0.807 0.807 0.349   
Number of banks   51 50 51   51 50 51 
No. of instruments    30 41    30 41 
Hansen test p-value    0.15 0.30    0.19 0.27 
A-B AR(1) test p-value    0.00 0.04    0.05 0.08 
A-B AR(2) test p-value    0.82 0.62    0.79 0.91 
IV-2SLS 
Instrumented: !"#$% Instrumented: !"#$% 
Instruments: &'($% ∆,-,'($%  ∆*+"$% !"#$. &'($. Instruments: &'($% ∆/-($%  ∆*+"$% !"#$. &'($. 
Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses; *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. 
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The product-development factor findings are presented as formulated in models 16 
and 17, which can be seen in Table 11. In both models, the p-value of AR(1) is 
significant and there is no serial correlation in AR(2), which shows the consistency of 
the estimated models. In addition, the instrumental variables are found to be valid 
through Hansen test.  
By looking at Model 16, the PLS variables with one and two lag have a negative 
impact on NPL; the coefficient of PLS with two lag is significant in all of the 
estimators, but there is minor influence for both lagged variables (at about 0.02%), 
which is attributed to the very low level of financing with PLS contracts. These 
findings indicate that with two years lagged variables and despite high risk-level 
involved with PLS instruments, increasing the PLS financing seems to decrease NPL. 
The other variable related to product-development is FID; the two coefficients, with 
one and two lags, are positively associated with NPL and they are significant in the 
GMM-difference model, which is in line with the expectations of this study. 
Consequently, it can be suggested that in the long term, increasing FID financing 
increases NPL by around 10%. This result thus indicates that although FID contracts 
are favourable and heavily utilised by GCC IB due to their low risk-level, the growth 
influence of FID contracts leads to more NPL than PLS instruments.  In other words, 
it can be concluded that the propensity of credit risk or of generating NPL is higher in 
FID financing than it is for PLS financing. 
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Table 11: Macro-Level Model 16 and Model 17 
(Including Product-Development Variables) 
 Model 16 Model 17 
 OLS 2SLS FE GMM-DF GMM-SYS OLS 2SLS FE GMM-DF GMM-SYS 
Variables NPL NPL NPL NPL NPL NPL NPL NPL NPL NPL !"#$% 0.945*** 0.942*** 0.437*** 0.339* 0.910*** 0.950*** 0.946*** 0.433*** 0.375* 0.912*** 
 (0.0387) (0.0583) (0.150) (0.198) (0.0694) (0.0372) (0.0562) (0.148) (0.200) (0.0657) &'($% 0.0176** 0.0158* 0.0358** 0.136** 0.132** 0.0203** 0.0185** 0.0438** 0.184** 0.132*** 
 (0.00858) (0.00869) (0.0160) (0.0680) (0.0537) (0.00866) (0.0086) (0.0173) (0.0743) (0.0504) )*"$% -0.079*** -0.0753** -0.215*** -0.174* -0.0545 -0.0640** -0.059** -0.175** -0.109 -0.0386 
 (0.0272) (0.0287) (0.0703) (0.0951) (0.0577) (0.0268) (0.0280) (0.0719) (0.110) (0.0571) ∆"#,$% -0.0002*** -0.00017** -0.000115 -0.000178 -4.77e-06      
 (5.69e-05) (6.50e-05) (8.58e-05) (0.00018) (0.0001)      ∆"#,$- -0.0002*** -0.0002*** -0.0002*** -0.00038** -0.0002*      
 (4.89e-05) (5.78e-05) (6.96e-05) (0.00015) (9.42e-05)      ∆./*$%      0.0994 0.0922 0.124* 0.195** 0.107 
      (0.0729) (0.0651) (0.0618) (0.0893) (0.0657) ∆./*$-      0.00572 0.0358 0.108** 0.157* 0.0633 
      (0.0372) (0.0500) (0.0432) (0.0822) (0.0578) 
Constant 0.0970 0.226 1.691  -8.799** -0.310 -0.158 0.880  -8.872** 
 (0.769) (0.871) (1.270)  (4.439) (0.740) (0.823) (1.295)  (4.100) 
           
Observations 239 232 239 188 239 239 232 239 188 239 
R-squared 0.806 0.807 0.309   0.805 0.806 0.314   
Number of banks   51 50 51   51 50 51 
No. of instruments    23 32    23 32 
Hansen test p-value    0.24 0.22    0.12 0.18 
A-B AR(1) test p-value    0.02 0.09    0.00 0.07 
A-B AR(1) test p-value    0.98 0.72    0.92 0.80 
IV-2SLS Instrumented: !"#$% Instrumented: !"#$% Instruments: &'($% ∆"#,$%	∆"#,$- ∆)*"$% !"#$- &'($- Instruments: &'($% ∆*$% ∆*$- ∆)*"$% !"#$- &'($- 
Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses; *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1; the GMM style model with three lag.  
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7.2 Robustness Check Using Panel Data Models  
To check the validity of IB results we apply panel data, fixed and random effect models, as 
another approach to examine the IB nexus with NPL. Another aim of this paper is to apply 
robustness check, for the determinants of NPL for the IB and IW, to consider the link 
between NPL and bank-level country-level factors, in particular, the variables represent IB 
sectoral financing and Islamic financing methods. To do so we include only IB and IW only 
form our data sample.  
The passages below present the results that describe the relationship between NPL and 
explanatory variables in the sampled IB and CB that provide IW in the GCC countries via 
OLS (with cluster robust), FE models, and RE models11.  
Table 12 shows the results for Model 18, which focuses on the impact of bank level and 
macroeconomic variables in NPL.  As can be seen, the Hausman specification test clearly 
rejects the null hypothesis for Model 18, implying that the RE estimate significantly differs 
from the FE estimate. Therefore, the FE specification is preferred, yet in Model 19 the null 
hypothesis is accepted, meaning that both estimators, FE and RE, are consistent and that 
systematically there is no difference. Thus, in this case the RE estimator is preferred. Model 
19 is, however, conducted to check the robustness of the Model 18 estimation, especially 
with regard to the direction of the obtained efficiency scores from the DEA and SFA 
methods. The coefficient of the RWA variable is statistically significant in all panel data 
estimators and positively related to NPL, which is in line with Berger and DeYoung (1997), 
which specifies that a rise in RWA, indicating a higher credit risk portfolio, leads to an 
increase in NPL by around 3%.     
With regard to the estimated coefficients of performance and profitability ratios, ROE and 
NIM, the relationship between ROE and NPL is negative and significant in all of the 
estimated models. This result indicates that a decrease in ROE leads to an increase in the 
NPL by about 12%, suggesting that the short-term effect of the managements of IB and IW 
may be not efficient enough when controlling the credit risk portfolios. This could verify the 
‘bad management’ hypothesis, which is consistent with the study by Louzis et al. (2012). 
Essentially, the financing portfolios of the GCC banks depend on FID contracts with more 																																								 																					
11 To detect for a	 multicollinearity problem, Variance Inflation Factor (VIF) is utilised in all of the panel data 
estimate models; according to this test it is found that in each of the explanatory variables the value of VIF is 
less than 1.30, which signifies that there is no multicollinearity (Greene, 2007: E5-18). This test is presented in 
the appendix section.    
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than 80% of total financing; in the short term the profits could thus increase dramatically due 
to the heavy reliance on these contracts, which in turn lead to a rise in the ROE.  
 
Table 12: Panel Data Estimate Results for Models 1 and 2 (with Bank-level and 
Macroeconomic Variables) 
 Model 18 Model 19 
 OLS robust FE RE OLS robust FE RE 
Variables  NPL NPL NPL NPL NPL NPL 
RWA 0.0165 0.0368*** 0.0319** 0.0146 0.0269* 0.0258** 
 (0.0151) (0.0140) (0.0133) (0.0145) (0.0138) (0.0130) 
ROE -0.114* -0.145*** -0.123*** -0.128** -0.146*** -0.131*** 
 (0.0562) (0.0251) (0.0230) (0.0605) (0.0254) (0.0228) 
NIM 0.185 0.792*** 0.429* 0.199 0.775*** 0.423* 
 (0.221) (0.282) (0.227) (0.231) (0.286) (0.226) !""#$% -4.341 -10.65*** -7.140***    
 (3.092) (2.557) (2.150)    !""&'%    -10.19** -18.71*** -14.76*** 
    (4.686) (5.118) (4.498) 
∆GDP -0.0599* -0.0213 -0.0541 -0.0473 -0.0387 -0.0550 
 (0.0302) (0.0655) (0.0558) (0.0310) (0.0659) (0.0557) 
Constant 6.605** 7.473*** 6.429*** 12.04** 16.17*** 14.02*** 
 (2.958) (2.071) (1.867) (4.388) (4.275) (3.813) 
       
Observations 198 198 198 198 198 198 
R-squared 0.214 0.310  0.216 0.294  
Number of banks  31 31  31 31 
Chi2(3) 
Hausman  Prob>chi2 
 10.53 
0.06 
 6.5 
0.26 
Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses; *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. 
 
In the case of the NIM variable, the estimated coefficient shows having a positive impact on 
NPL, implying that increasing the NIM boosts NPL by about 42%. Thus, the findings provide 
evidence that the transactions of IB and Islamic financing tend to be risker than other 
counterparties, specifically when PLS contracts are involved, wherein these transactions 
could produce a significant profit, but they are riskier than FID and other financial contracts 
that lead to higher defaulted loans.     
As can be seen in Table 12, the efficiency coefficient is significant in all of the panel data 
estimators and associated negatively with NPL, proving, in the short term, the ‘bad 
management’ hypothesis in IB and CB with IW. It should be noted that the observed negative 
relationship supports the ‘bad luck’ hypothesis resulting from the stock market downturn in 
2006 in most of the GCC countries, in addition to the global financial crisis over the period of 
2008 to 2009 (Khamis et al., 2010). All of these external factors might have taken place to 
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create higher costs in administrating bank solvency and problem loans, which have an 
adverse effect on efficiency.  
The findings of Model 20 are depicted in Table 13, which presents the results for 
organisational, product-development, and macroeconomic variables. As depicted, the 
Hausman test results indicate the acceptance of the null hypothesis, thereby illustrating that 
both estimators are consistent and that the RE estimator is favourable. By looking at the 
variables related to Islamic financing contracts and despite that the coefficient of PLS growth 
rate is relatively small, it is statistically significant and it has a negative relationship with 
NPL. This finding demonstrates that the nature of PLS contracts are risker than other Islamic 
financing contracts, and increasing transactions with such instruments in the short term may 
lead to a decline in NPL, given that a higher risk financing portfolio, namely PLS-oriented 
contracts, could bring higher revenue.  
As the results in Table 13 show, the FID variable represents a significant and positive 
relationship with NPL, which corresponds to the expectations of this study, implying that due 
to risk-level-related reasons the financing portfolios of most of the IB in the GCC countries 
concentrate on FID-oriented financing and loans due to the high risk associated with PLS 
contracts.  
In relation to macro-level factors, the results in Table 13 show that the real GDP growth 
coefficient illustrates a negative link with NPL (from 5% to 10%), supporting the ‘prosperity’ 
hypothesis and implying that the growth in real macroeconomic terms has a direct but 
adverse impact on NPL. In addition, the growth rate of RECIB financing has a significant and 
negative impact on NPL, signifying that an increase in financing such sectors by 1% led to a 
decline in NPL by about 3%. Such findings suggest the interaction between real GDP and 
business cycle related to RECIB is high and that the growth of both variables decreases the 
NPL. This can be explained by the reason that IB in the GCC countries are more exposed to 
real estate market risk because they heavily directed their financing to this particular sector12.   
 
 
																																								 																					
12 See Figure 4 in the appendix, which illustrates that the average of financing percentage for each sector to total 
financing in IB in GCC countries, whereas the proportion of real estate and construction sector has increased 
gradually since 2005 and has remained in the highest level among other sectors in 2009 and 2010.    
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Table 13: Panel Data Estimate Results (with Organisational, Product-Development, and 
Macroeconomic Variables) 
 Model 20 
 OLS robust FE RE 
Variables NPL NPL NPL 
RWA 0.0086 0.0248* 0.0201 
 (0.011) (0.0140) (0.0131) 
∆PLS -0.00069*** -0.00043** -0.0005*** 
 (0.00017) (0.00018) (0.00017) 
∆FID 0.210*** 0.174** 0.187** 
 (0.065) (0.0752) (0.0737) 
∆RECIB -0.033*** -0.0250*** -0.0272*** 
 (0.0097) (0.0054) (0.0052) 
∆GDP -0.111*** -0.105 -0.108** 
 (0.0377) (0.066) (0.054) 
Constant 5.361*** 3.625*** 4.112*** 
 (1.462) (1.259) (1.202) 
    
Observations 198 198 198 
R-squared 0.240 0.236  
Number of banks  31 31 
Chi2(3) 
Hausman  Prob>chi2 
 3.12 
0.68 
Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses; *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. 	
8. Concluding Remarks    
In this paper we use GMM models to examine the impact of the sectoral distribution of 
Islamic financing on NPL in the GCC’s banking system, which helps to locate the impact of 
sectoral Islamic financing and Islamic financing methods on the NPL in the GCC’s 
commercial banking sector. With regard to the results, the real GDP growth supports the 
‘prosperity’ hypothesis and implies that the growth in real macroeconomic terms has a 
negative impact on NPL.   
In terms of bank-specific factors, RWA play a vital role as an early warning indicator for 
increasing NPL, as it reflects the high-level risk of loans portfolio combination. The 
association between non-lagged efficiency and NPL supports the ‘bad management’ 
hypothesis, this negative relationship could indicate the ‘bad luck’ case, which may be caused 
by external factors that create more costs in administrating bank solvency and problem loans, 
such as the downturn in 2006 and the global financial crisis from 2008 to 2009 13. The one-
year lag efficiency variable is, however, positively associated with NPL, suggesting the 
presence of the ‘skimping’ policy in reducing credit administration expenses. In addition and 																																								 																					
13 Lagoarde-Segot (2015) indicates that consequences of financial crisis in academic research could be a 
problematic issue, as some studies have argued that the financial crisis was a crisis of values. The debatable 
point is that ‘facts’ are measurable factors but ‘values’ are not, therefore a number of finance studies do not 
involve the terms of ‘values’ and ‘ethics’ in their research.    
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due to the previous year, there could be a shortage in monitoring borrowers, which increases 
NPL.  
In terms of macro-level sectoral financing, the growth rates of MI and REC present a 
relatively similar adverse impact on NPL. The RECIB financing shows a negative impact on 
NPL; these findings suggest that in the GCC countries, there is a substantial interaction 
between the real GDP growth and the real estate and construction sectors, supporting the 
notion that the financing of IB is more related to real estate and construction projects, which 
increases the risk exposure. Hence, it is suggested that diversification is a crucial step 
required for bank managers and policy makers in the GCC region. Indeed, they need to focus 
more on increasing the financing to other sectors that are embedded within the real economy 
such as manufacturing and other productive industries so that the risk of NPL can be reduced 
as the relative propensity of failure is less in these sectors than in the real estate sector.  
The findings related to the banks’ structural and organisational development factors show that 
an increase in the assets growth for IB leads to an increase in NPL, indicating that IB could 
have less ability to diversify in financing portfolios. This would in turn mean that these banks 
are more at risk. On the other hand, the relationship between CBA growth and NPL is 
negative, suggesting that these CB are more capable in diversifying financing projects and 
hence decreasing risk taking. Overall, Lagoarde-Segot and Lucey (2007) suggest that 
transparency in economics and financial institutions is a vital to sustain portfolio returns.    
The product development of IF factors demonstrates that the PLS growth shows negative 
impact on NPL, but with minor impact, which is attributed by the very low level of financing 
with PLS contracts. Such findings suggest that despite the high risk-level in PLS instruments, 
increasing the PLS financing could lead to a decrease in NPL. The FID variable did, 
however, present a positive relationship with NPL, indicating that although FID contracts are 
favoured by IB in the GCC, the growth path of FID financings could harm the loan quality 
more than PLS instruments. 
It should be noted that the causes behind NPL can be attributed to macroeconomic, financial, 
or institutional factors, and this study, therefore, investigated several economic causations 
between NPL and some selected macro-level and micro-level factors, which are classified 
into endogenous and exogenous factors, by utilising the dynamic panel data (GMM) models. 
Furthermore, in the present Islamic banking literature on the subject of loan quality issues, no 
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study has yet attempted to examine the impact of Islamic financing and Islamic finance 
contracts on NPL; this gap, thus, points to the significance of this study and its contributions, 
which examines the effects on the loan quality of the GCC’s commercial banking sector.  
Future research could utilise other empirical techniques such as Granger causality in addition 
to the dynamic panel data models so as to examine the intertemporal relationships. Further, 
the relationship between Islamic financing, Islamic contracts, and NPL could be equally 
explored by taking into account the longer time period, to examine longer dynamic effects by 
increasing the lag numbers, which enables the application of different estimates such as the 
panel vector autoregressive.  
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Appendix  
 
Variance inflation factor (VIF) Multicollinearity test 
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 
Variables VIF 1/VIF Variables VIF 1/VIF Variables VIF 1/VIF 
RWA 1.04     0.9631 RWA 1.02 0.9778 RWA 1.02     0.9813 
ROE 1.27     0.7879 ROE 1.15 0.8717 ∆PLS 1.08     0.9288 
NIM 1.11     0.9045 NIM 1.09 0.9166 ∆FID 1.05     0.9506 !""#$% 1.16     0.8608    ∆RECIB 1.12     0.8965 
   !""&'% 1.07 0.9343    
∆GDP 1.07     0.9331 ∆GDP 1.10 0.9125 ∆GDP 1.03     0.9667 
    Mean VIF 1.13     Mean VIF 1.09 Mean VIF 1.06 
 
Model 4 Model 5 
Variables VIF 1/VIF Variables VIF 1/VIF ()*+, 1.03 0.9752 ()*+, 1.01 0.9872 -./+, 1.02 0.9804 -./+, 1.01 0.9920 ∆12)+, 1.01 0.9900 ∆343456	12)+, 1.01 0.9929 
    Mean VIF 1.02     Mean VIF 1.01 
 
Model 6 Model 7 
Variables VIF 1/VIF Variables VIF 1/VIF ()*+, 1.04 0.9587 ()*+, 1.03 0.9752 -./+, 1.01 0.9895 -./+, 1.02 0.9763 -8!+, 1.02 0.9805 (9:+, 1.02 0.9828 ∆12)+, 1.02 0.9794 ∆12)+, 1.02 0.9779 
    Mean VIF 1.02     Mean VIF 1.02 
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Model 8 Model 9 
Variables VIF 1/VIF Variables VIF 1/VIF ()*+, 1.17 0.8565 ()*+, 1.14 0.8738 -./+, 1.05 0.9541 -./+, 1.08 0.9277 !""#$% 4.50 0.2222 !""&'% 2.80 0.3572 !""+,#$% 4.51 0.2217 !""+,&'% 2.79 0.3582 ∆12)+, 1.02 0.9792 ∆12)+, 1.03 0.9707 
    Mean VIF 2.45     Mean VIF 1.77 
 
Model 10 Model 11 
Variables VIF 1/VIF Variables VIF 1/VIF ()*+, 1.06 0.9453 ()*+, 1.04 0.9596 -./+, 1.02 0.9835 -./+, 1.01 0.9946 ∆9;/+, 1.08 0.9290 ∆9./+, 1.02 0.9809 ∆12)+, 1.07 0.9366 ∆12)+, 1.03 0.9732 
    Mean VIF 1.05     Mean VIF 1.02 
 
Model 12 Model 13 
Variables VIF 1/VIF Variables VIF 1/VIF ()*+, 1.10 0.9130 ()*+, 1.05 0.9495 -./+, 1.02 0.9850 -./+, 1.02 0.9810 ∆9;9./+, 1.13 0.8841 ∆<;/+, 1.05 0.9482 ∆12)+, 1.10 0.9116 ∆12)+, 1.04 0.9584 
    Mean VIF 1.08     Mean VIF 1.04 
 
Model 14 Model 15 Model 16 
Variables VIF 1/VIF Variables VIF 1/VIF Variables VIF 1/VIF ()*+, 1.04 0.9658 ()*+, 1.03 0.9732 ()*+, 1.04 0.9614 -./+, 1.03 0.9671 -./+, 1.03 0.9679 -./+, 1.06 0.9450 
∆MI 1.13 0.8810 ∆REC 1.20 0.8299 ∆RECIB 1.13 0.8864 ∆12)+, 1.11 0.8994 ∆12)+, 1.19 0.8398 ∆12)+, 1.08 0.9276 
    Mean VIF 1.08     Mean VIF 1.11 Mean VIF 1.08 
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Model 17 Model 18 
Variables VIF 1/VIF Variables VIF 1/VIF ()*+, 1.03 0.9750 ()*+, 1.04 0.9624 -./+, 1.02 0.9851 -./+, 1.02 0.9851 ∆-!<+, 1.21 0.8243 ∆-!<9;+, 1.05 0.9486 ∆12)+, 1.23 0.8139 ∆12)+, 1.05 0.9519 
    Mean VIF 1.12     Mean VIF 1.04 
 
Model 19 Model 20 
Variables VIF 1/VIF Variables VIF 1/VIF ()*+, 1.06 0.9460 ()*+, 1.04 0.9580 -./+, 1.01 0.9886 -./+, 1.01 0.9904 ∆)*=+, 1.03 0.9693 ∆"92+, 1.05 0.9547 ∆)*=+> 1.03 0.9702 ∆"92+> 1.03 0.9722 ∆12)+, 1.06 0.9466 ∆12)+, 1.05 0.9538 
    Mean VIF 1.04     Mean VIF 1.04 
 
 
 
 
 
